公路駕駛與相關保險行為之一般化分析

本文建立模型說明公路駕駛人如何決定最適行駛速度，以及自我與市場保險的最適水準。研究結果顯示：首先，在基本模型部份，最適行為分析得出行駛速度、自我保險與市場保險行為，各項變數的相對最適支出與該變數對自負比例，以及事故傷害的彈性成正比。其次，若駕駛人超速行駛，則隨超速幅度遞增的懲處，將較定額罰款更能降低駕駛人的行駛速度。若駕駛人遵守速限規範，駕駛人自我保險與市場保險可能因速度的限制，出現同向或反向的變動。最後，在兩選擇變數同時受到政府部門限制的情況，若受限制變數相對於原先最適選擇差異不大，使自我保險、市場保險與行駛速度在事故發生下的所得效果均保持為負值，則駕駛人將以提高未受限制變數以為因應。反之，最後的結果則必須視各所得效果的關係而定。
關鍵字：公路駕駛、自我保險、速度限制
Abstract
This article tries to develop an economic model to explain the motorists optimal decision rule for driving speed and insurance expenditures. The results show that: 1. Without speed limitation, the optimal behavior analysis indicates that the motorists optimal driving speed and insurance expenditures have positive relationship with the proportion of self-liability and the elasticity of accidental injury. 2. With mandatory speed limitation, the effects of in self-insurance and other related insurance levels are ambiguous. Moreover, if government regulates on any two endogenous variables around their initial optimal levels, then the negative wealth effect would make the motorist elevate the level of the unrestricted variable. Otherwise, the final results would depend on the magnitude of the wealth effect.
Keywords: roadway speed, self-insurance, speed limitation