職業工會勞工參加職業災害保險制度之研究－逆選擇與道德風險的觀點

　　職業災害保險是職災補償制度的一種，其目的在加強雇主的責任。然而，職業工會勞工在參加職災保險時因無固定雇主，無法判定其事故發生與執行職務之間的關聯性，再加上其非強制性參加，因而在職災保險制度當中衍生出許多的問題。

　　本研究主要是從逆選擇和道德風險的觀點，探討職業工會勞工參加職業災害保險時所可能存在的問題，研究資料取自1996年至2001年職業災害保險的經驗資料，同時依不同行業分別計算，並輔以統計上的檢定以求其客觀性。

　　研究結果發現，職業工會勞工在參加職災保險時存在著逆選擇行為，亦即其會因為經濟環境或個人等因素選擇離開職災保險體系，但不會受到費率調整的影響。此外，職業工會勞工在職災給付上的道德風險的行為主要是在申請給付的發生率明顯高於其他身分的勞工，作者據此提出結論與建議。

關鍵字：職業工會勞工、自營作業者、職業災害保險、職災補償、逆選擇、道德風險
Note on Union Workers Participating in Occupational Injurly Insurance: The Perspective of Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard
Abstract
Occupational injury insurance is a kind of workers compensation; it is an enforced requirement of the employer and developed out of the social insurance principle. For union workers, there are many problems with occupational injury insurance, especially adverse selection and morale hazard.

This article is focused on issues of adverse selection and morale hazard for union workers participating in occupational injury insurance and analyzes differences with other workers. Data was collected from 1996 to 2001 in the occupational injury insurance database and compares underwriting and benefit periods.

Results reveal that there was adverse selection in occupational injury insurance for the union workers, and union workers avoided occupational injury insurance schemes more frequently than other workers. In addition, union workers claimed benefits more frequently than others. Finally, the author provides concluding remarks and suggestions.

Keywords: occupational union worker, self-employer, occupational injury insurance, workers compensation, adverse selection, morale hazard